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The Peaceful and the Vic.lent Road--A Latin American Debate
Ernst Halperin
If you ask any Latin American Leftist what is the main sub-
ject of debate within the Latin American Communist and non-Communist
extreme Left today, he will invairably name tie issue of the Peace-
1ful or the Violent Road to Socialism. .And he will explain that in
this debate the old-guard Communists loyal to Moscow stand for the
Soviet policy of the peaceful road, whereas the Castroites and that
pro-Chinese Communidts are for the Chinese and Cuban policy of the
violent road, that is, for armed struggle, guerrilla warfare, and
urban terrorism.
Actually, matters are not cuite as simple as that. In theory,
the Chinese and Cubans do not deny the possibility of a peaceful
transition to socialism, although they will actually hasten to add
that there has as yet been no instance anywhere of such a transition 2
This is an expanded version of a talk given at the Airlie
House Conference in Warrenton, ginia on Sino-Soviet Relations and
Arms Control on September 2, 1965.
2 Fidel Castro, in his speech to the Havana Congress of American
Women on January 16, 1963, as reported by El Siglo (Santiago de Chile),
January 18: "We do not deny the possibility of a peaceful transition,
although we are still waiting for the first such case. But we do not
deny it, since we are not dogmatists0 "
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, in its
"Proposal concerning the General Line of the International Communist
2The Chinese do not ask for the abandonment of peaceful political ac-
tivity, they only demand that Communist parties should pursue a policy
of "walking on two legs"', ice. of preparing for both eventualities, for
violent revolution as well as for peaceful transition0 3 The Cubans,
too, are not dogmatic, Although incessantly stressing the need for
armed action, they were perfectly willing and even eager to let their
supporters work for a peaceful advent to power in both Chile and
Brazil in 1963-64, in Chile through a presidential election and in
Brazil through the gradual infiltration of the left-of-center Goulart
government by extremists.
As for the Russians, although they insist on the feasibility of
a peaceful transition to socialism, they have never declared this to
be the only possible or permissible road. They do not say whether
Movement," June 1L, 1963, quoted from William E. Griffith. The Sino-
Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Massc: The MIT Press, 196L), po 269: "In
specific historical conditions, Marx and Lenin did raise the possibility
that revolution may develop peacefully. But, as Lenin pointed out, the
peaceful development of revolution is an opportunity Ivery seldom to
be met within the history of revolution.,
As a matter of fact, there is no historical precedent for peace-
ful transition from capitalisn to socialism."
"The proletarian party must prepare itself for two eventualities-
while preparing for a peaceful development of the revolution, it must
also fully prepare for a non-peaceful developmentot (Ibido, po 269o)
The Leninist doctrine of the inevitability of violent revolution
was first revised, and declared no longer valid, by the Twentieth Congress
3the peaceful road or the violent road will prevail in a majority of
countries, But as regards Latin America, even the most eloquent
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956 (see
Nc S. Khrushchevs Report to the Party Congress, the speech by A. I,
Mikoyan to the Congress, and the Congress resolution on Khrushchevis
report.) The current Soviet ideological manual,. Fundamentals of
Marxism-Leninism, 2nd revised ed0 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publish.
ing House, 1963) p 503., states: "While noting that a real possibil
ity of a peaceful revolution has appeared, Marxists-Leninists are at
the same time aware of the fact that in a number of cases a sharp ac-
centuation of the class strug>gle is inevitable. Wherever the reac-
tionary bourgeoisie has a strong army and police force at its disposal,
the working class will encounter fierce resistance, There can be no
doubt that in a number of capitalist countries the overthrow of the
bourgeois dictatorship will inevitably take place through an armed
class struggle."
The same Manual. (po 505) also declares that "the revolutionary
parties of the working class strive to master all forms of struggle
peaceful and non-peaceful, parliamentary and non-parliamentary so
that they may be ready at need to resort to the one most in accordance
with the situation and the interests of the working people n
In theory, the policy advocated by the Soviets thus does not
appear to differ greatly from that advocated by the CCP CC in its
"Proposal Concerning the General Line.' But in practice, communist
parties which enjoy the benefits oi legality (and even some clandestine
ones) are often reluctant to make preparations for an armed struggleC
since it would be difficult if not impossible to keep this secret. The
leaders of the Chilean Communists have openly rejected the dual policy
of "walking on both legsc" At their Twelfth Party Congress, held in
March 1962, their Politburo member Orlando Millas declared: "There is
talk of a policy of the two legs", of moving at the same time along
advocate of the Peaceful Road, Chilean Party Secretary Luis Corvalan,
is anything but confident in his predictions., All he asks is that the
possibility of the peaceful road should not be denied for some coun-
tries--specifically, of course, for his own.
The Soviet, Cuban, and Chinese views thus do not seem to be so
far apart that a compromise should be impossible. Why, then, the
long-drawn-out, angry debate, which shows no sign of calming down, and
has already led to a number of expulsions, splits, and secessions?
In order to understand this, one must first of all rid oneself
of the notion that the HPeaceful Road" is a policy imposed on the Latin
American Communist parties from the outside, that is, dictated by the
Soviet Union. Given the disintegration of discipline in the interna-
tional Communist movement, the Russians are in no position today to
two lines, one the peaceful road and the other the violent road, We
hold the theory of two lines, two different legs, to be pernicious,
because it makes you limp, and we prefer to walk with two equal legs
which belong to one sole Marxist-Leninist body," (Hacia la Conquista
de un Gobierno Popular, Documentos del XII Congreso Nacional del Partido
Comunista de Chile (Santiago, 1962), p. 12.)
In December 1962 Luis Corvalan admitted that the violent road
taken by the Cuban revolutionaries "is also, speaking in general terms,
the most probable road in other countries, perhaps in most of the coun-
tries of the continent. But there can be no certainty that all of them
will take that road." (Nuestra Epocha the Spanish-language edition of
the World Marxist Review, December 1962),
impose policies on Communist partiesc What is more, they actually do
not insist on the Latin American Communist parties following the
Peaceful Road, While stressing the viability of the peaceful transi-
tion to socialism, they are making it clear that it is up to the
individual parties themselves to decide whether the conditions for
such a transition are given in their country. It is not the Russians
who are pressing the Latin American Communist parties to keep to the
peaceful road; it is these parties themselves, or at least their over=
whelming majority, who reject the Violent 'Road, because it is contrary
to their traditions and their interests.
The Communist Parties of Latin America lack a vigorous revolu-
tionary tradition. Apart from the 1932 rising in the Central American
republic of El Salvador, which was sparked off but not actually led
by the Communists, and the 1935 insurrection of Luis Carlos Prestes
in Brazil, there have only been some instances of communist participa-
tion in risings staged by non-communist groupsc And from the Popular
Front period of the Thirties onwards, the history of these Communist
parties has been one of the most extraordinary opportunism. Communist
parties have indiscriminately cooperated with dictators and with demo-
cratic parties of the Right as well as of the Left, Sometimes they
have split into two parties with opposing policies, one collaborating
with a dictator and another with the democratic opposition, only to
6reunite after the political situation had changedc6
In spite of all their efforts and their extreme tactical elas-
ticity nearly all the Latin American Communist parties--Chile being
the one notable exception- -have failed to build up a mass following'-
they are mostly composed of small cliques of intellectuals and a hand,
ful of trade-union bureaucrats, without any substantial base among the
workers. I would suggest the following reasons for the docility of
the Latin American Communist parties and for their lack of success in
an area where social conditions would appear to favor the spread of
communism.
The Latin American communists traditional lack of dynamism
would seem to be due to the fact that right up to the end of the 1950's
Latin America was a very minor front in the campaign for world domina-
tion waged by the international Communist movement. Before the devel-
opment of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile in 1957, the Soviet
Union was strictly a land power, and a land power situated literally
at the opposite end of the globe from Latin Americao It would not
have been in a position to afford military protection to any communist
6 For the opportunistic behavior of the Communist parties of Latin
America throughout the last thirty years, and for its motivations, see
Robert J,, Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick, N0, J.:
Rutgers University, 1957) and Victor Alba, Esquema
historico del Comunismo en Iberoamerica, 3rd ed. (Mexico, D. Fo:
Ediciones Occidentales, 1960)c The matter is also dealt with in the
present authorv s Nationalism and Communism in Chile (Cambridge, Mass.:
The MIT Press, 1965), Chapter I.
7government in the Western Hemisphere, What is more, even the largest
of the Latin American countries were militarily, politically, and
economically too weak to be a factor of any importance in the determina-
tion of Soviet state policies. Hence the Soviet leaders, lack of
7interest in Latin America, which was bound to have a demoralizing ef-
fect on the leadership of the Latin American communist parties. Their
status in the hierarchy of world communism was low; little was expected
of them; and they thus gradually became accustomed to opportunistic
policies of dubious alliances for small gains.
There was a brief stirring of Soviet interest in Latin America
around the time of Stalin's death, but the establishment of a Soviet
zone of influence in the area only became possible with the development
of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile in 1957., which put the Soviet
Union into the position of being able to retaliate directly--or to
threaten to retaliate--against the United States in the event of an
American attack on a Soviet base in the area. Very shortly after the
Soviets had developed the ICBM,, Latin America became one of the major
Cold War fronts. By that time, however, the Communist parties of the
area had already degenerated into small political machines hiring out
their services to dictators and democrats, military and civilian,
For this lack of interest, which became apparent as early as
the nineteen twenties, see Victor Alba s Esquema historico del Comunismo
en Iberoamerica,
8conservative and middle-of-the-road politicos. They could be of
little help to the Soviet Union, which thus turned to other forces
for assistance in its drive to establish itself in the Western Hem-
isphere,
The numerical weakness of the Latin American Communist parties
and their lack of influence outside a restricted sector of the in-
telligentsia, would seem to be due mainly to the fact that the organi-
zational principles and technicues of the international Communist
movement are not effective in the specific conditions of Latin America.
The organizational formula of the Communist parties is extreme centrali-
zation and rigid discipline. But abstract loyalty--to an organization
or an idea, as opposed to loyalty to an individual leader--is poorly
developed in Latin Americac "Organization ment are scarce in Latin
America, and political parties based on ideologies, as well as trade
unions, cooperatives, and similar bodies are more difficult and tend
to be far less efficient than in Europe.
Furthermore their Marxist credo has led the Latin American
Communists to concentrate their organizational efforts on industrial
labor. Unfortunately for them, this group constitutes a privileged
stratum of the Latin American proletariat and is hardly a revolutionary
element. Nor have the Communists been able to make much headway among
the urban sub-proletariat of the shanty-town slums of the great cities 08
8 Even in Chile, where the Communists are far stronger and more
effective than in other Latin American countries, the Christian Democratic
9Most shanty-town dwellers come from the countryside; the city offers
them far better living-conditions and prospects than their former
life as agricultural laborers or tenant-farmers0 9
candidate Eduardo Frei ran ahead of the Socialist-Communist candidate
Allende in the shanty-town districts of Santiago and Valparaiso in
the presidential election of September 19614 . In the Peruvian presi-
dential election of 1963, a majority of the shanty-town vote in Lima
went to a rightist candidate, the fonner dictator General Odria. In
the Venezuelan presidential election of 1963, the shanty-town vote in
Caracas favored a right-of-center moderate, Arturo Uslar-Pietri. In
the city of Rio de Janeiro, State Governor Carlos Lacerda., a fervent
anti-communist, has successfully wooed the shanty-town dwellers by the
implementation of an impressive program of school-building and elec-
trification.
For a study of the mentality of the shanty-town dwellers of
one Latin American big city see Frank Bonilla: "Rios a Favelas,"
American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, East Coast South
America Series, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (Brazil), 1961o Bonilla comes to
the following conclusions: "Thus the favelado, however unrealistically,
does not fell hopelessly trapped in the favela. He sees the chances
for escape of his children as goodo But the apparent faith in the
possibilities for economic and social advance is not matched by belief
in the potential benefits to come through political action. Nearly
half of the favelados said there is nothing to be gained by political
activity 0 0 0 ; about the same proportion of skilled workers said
they attach little or no importance to their political opinions and
activities. Thus neither the skilled worker nor the favelado is highly
politicized; the skilled worker differs politically from the favelado
chiefly in his participation in an organization (his union) that is set
up to defend his interests.
10
On the other hand, the Latin American communists have on the
whole neglected work among the peasants and agrarian proletariat, who
are very much an underprivileged group. The fateful decision to con-
centrate on urban areas was taken as early as the nineteen-twenties,
when the Comintern rejected the Peruvian Mariateguils proposal to base
communist activities in Latin America on the Indio, which would have
introduced the potent stimulant of racialism into communist propaganda
by presenting the struggle for communism as a struggle against the
descendants of the white invaders from Europe. Since then,, there has
been much talk among Latin American communists about the need for a
"worker-peasant alliance , but little attempt to proselytize in the
villages. As the communist parties grew more and more opportunistic,
they became less and less inclined to sacrifice cadres in the suicidal
work of propagandizing in the countrysidec The word "suicidalH is no
exaggeration. In many Latin American countries the big landowners
(caciques as they are called in Spanish Latin America, coroneis as
they are called in Brazil) make the law in their domain. They not
only control the municipal police but often also have a retinue of
cutthroats for extra-legal work. It is no coincidence that law-
abiding Chile is the one Latin American country in which the Communists
have been able to build up a substantial following in the countryside.
In that country, the municipal police were abolished by the anti-
oligarchical dictator Carlos Ibanez in the nineteen- twenties, and re-
placed by a centrally controlled police corps, the Carabineros. The
landowners were thus deprived of one of the main pillars of their
11
authority. Since then, their political control over the rural areas
has gradually weakened, a development which has benefited not only
the Communists and Socialists but also their democratic rivals, the
Christian Democrats.
But who are the Latin American Communists? competitors on the
extreme Left, who stand for a policy of violent revolution, guerrilla
warfare and urban terrorism? These are nationalists swayed by fierce
hatred of the United States. Like the Communists, they are an urban
group, composed mainly of middle-class intellectuals with a high pro-
portion of university and high-school students; unlike their communist
rivals, they have made untiring efforts to win the support of the
peasantry, which have so far met only with very limited success. In
the late nineteen-fifties and early nineteen-sixties, the emergence
of the Soviet Union as a power willing and apparently able to dispute
United States domination of the Hemisphere caused these extreme na-
tionalists to proclaim their allegiance to the Soviet ideology of
Marxism-Leninism. Most of them, however, refused to join the discred-
ited, opportunistic Communist parties, preferring either to form their
own wildly extremist movementslO or to form revolutionary left-wing
10 Such as the MOEC (Movements of Workers, Students and Peasants)
in Colombia, the MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left) in Venezuela
and Peru, the "l4th of July" movement in Santo Domingo, the "13th of
November" movement in Guatemala, and the EPG (People's Guerrilla Arny)
in Argentina.
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groups within existing7 deiocratic parties. Nor can they be described
as fellow-travellers in the European sense of the word, ice. as people
who blindly follow the Soviets wherever they goo Their allegiance to
the Soviet Union is dependent on that power's belligerence vis=1-vis
the United States; ary weakening of the Soviet attitude is regarded
with high disfavor by these Latin American nationalists and tends to
bring them closer to the Chinese side. This, of course, has been es-
pecially the case since the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.
China, however, has one great failing in their eyes: it is too weak
to be a useful ally in the struggle to wrest control over Latin America
from the United States. In spite of their disappointment and disillusion-
ment, they can therefore hardly afford a complete break with the Soviet
Union. What they would really like is not a Chinese victory in the
framework of the international Communist movement, but the adoption of
the tough, belligerent Chinese line by Soviet foreign policy0
The Chinese can thus depend even less than the Russians on using
the Latin American nationalists as their instrument. In order to es-
tablish really dependable groups, they have therefore resorted to a
policy of splitting away pro-Chinese elements from the official
Communist parties and establishing Communist parties of their own. Such
splits have so far occurred in Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Colombia. Unfortunately for the Chinese, the leaders of the new pro-
Chinese Communist parties are mostly hardened, unimaginative Stalinist
party bureaucrats unlikely to develop much initiative, Their chances
of success are small, In Brazil, for instance, the pro-Chinese Communist
13
party failed as miserablv as the official pro-Soviet party of Luis
Carlos Prestes when confronted with the military coup of March 31,
196L .
The really dynamic elements in the Latin American extreme Left
are the nationalists, and these look to Cuba far more than to Peking
or Moscow for guidance and leadership. Indeed the Cubans, specifically
Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, are the prototypes of the Latin American
extreme nationalists, or Jacobin Leftists, as Robert Jo Alexander terms
them,11 In his book Guerrilla Warfare, published in 1960., Che Guevara
formulated the three theses which form the basis of Castroite political
theory:12 (1) The people in anms can win a war against the regular
army. (2) It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for revolu-
tion exist; the guerrilla nucleus ("foco") can create them. (3) In
underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area for the armed
struggle.l3
11 See Robert J. Alexander's Today's Latin America.
12 In Castroism, Theory and Practice (New York, N0 Y0 : Praeger,
1965), Theodore Draper rightly points out that as a theory, Castroism
is too rudimentary to be called an ideology, and should rather be con-
sidered as a mere program for action,
13 Translated from Ernesto Guevara, La Guerra de Guerrillas,
(Havana: Ediciones Minfar, 1960). Two English editions of this work,
one by Praeger, New York, and the other by Monthly Review Press, New
York, are available, but both translations are inaccurate. For a de-
tailed analysis of Castroite doctrine see Theodore Draper, Castroism,
Theory and Practice. Regis Debray's "'Le castrisme: la Longue Marche
14
That same year, in his speech on July 26, 1960, Fidel Castro
himself issued the call: "The Andes mountain range shall become the
Sierra Maestra of all South America," Since then, Castroite groups
have made numerous attempts to implement Guevara's thesis that revolu-
tionary conditions can be created by the activities of a guerrilla
nucleus. Most of these have failed, but in at least two cases, in
Venezuela and Guatemala, guerrilla fighting has now been going on
for years without the government forces being able to force a decision. 1
With the exception of the Communist Party of Venezuela, which
has adopted the Castroite line, the Latin American communists have
rejected Castro's call to action, and ever since, the heated debate
between the proponents of the peaceful road and those of the violent
road has been going on. The terminology of the debate is somewhat
de L'Amerique Latine," Les Temps Modernes, No. 2224, January 1965., is
an extensive exposition of Castroite doctrine from the movement's own
point of view.
124In Les Temps Modernes Regis Debray gives the following list
of guerrilla activities since 1959: Argentina 19599 Paraguay 1959,
Santo Domingo 1960, Paraguay 1962, Colombia 1961, Equador 1962, Venezuela
1962, Peru 1961, Peru 1963, Argentina 1964---all unsuccessful; Venezuela
1963, Colombia 196, all still continuing, and Bolivia 1964 (rightist)c
To these must now be added the very serious 1965 outbreak in Peru,
which seems likely to develop into a prolonged guerrilla war. Strangely
enough, Regis Debray fails to mention the Guatemalan 13th of November
Movement, whose guerrilla bands have been in the field since 1962. This
omission may possibly be due to political divergencies between the
Castroites and the Guatemalan guerrillas.
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obscure, and often unintelligible to outsiders. Take, for instance,
the use which the Communist parties have made of the term "National
Liberation Front"--a cold-war slogan meaning the fomation of a united
front of Communists and non-Communists against "American imperialism,9 t
The Latin American Communists have used this formula to justify the
continuation of their accustomed policy of opportunistic alliances
with political groups of the most diverse tendencies. To build a
broad National Front means, in their interpretation, to water down
one's program so as to make it acceptable to moderates and even con-
servatives. Although the National Liberation Front is allegedly di-
rected against the United States, it has served the Communists as an
excuse for cooperation even with pro-American groups, the assumption
being that in the course of time these groups would be weaned away
from their allegiance,
The Castroites have accepted the formula of the National Libera-
tion Front, but they insist on this Front having a radical program
and being restricted to those political forces which are really willing
to go out and fight in an armed struggle for the installation of a new
regime of the Cuban type. The Communists object that a radical program
would scare away the Itnational bourgeoisie," and thus the debate has
been narrowed down to the subject of the "national bourgeoisie," of
its role and position and whether it is a worthwhile ally.
The term "national bourgeoisie," in Communist language, signifies
all those Latin American capitalists who have no links with American
monopolies and whose existence is threatened by the activities of
16
American capital in their country.15 As far as Latin America is con-
cerned, this concept seems to me to be a mere figment of the communistsv
imagination. I do not believe that there is in Latin America any
sizeable group of capitalists so antagonistic to the United States and
so threatened by the activities of American monopoly capitalism that
they would be willing to unite with the communists and Castroites in
a life-and-death struggle against the United States,
The Castroites would thus appear to be perfectly right in their
assertion that the "national bourgeoisie" is not an important element
in a "national liberation struggle."1 6 But the Communists are less
The Soviet manual Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, po 16,
gives the following definition of the term "national bourgeoisie",3
"The arbitrary rule of the foreign monopolies impels also part of the
bourgeoisie in the Latin American countries to take an anti-imperialist
stand. As in other countries, differentiation is taking place within
the bourgeoisie, which is becoming increasingly differentiated into a
national bourgeoisie (mainly a petty-bourgeoisie, and a middle bour-
geoisie connected with industry) and a big bourgeoisie, part of which
is directly linked with foreign monopolies and, together with the
latifundia-owners, serves as the mainstay of U., S, imperialism in Latin
America. The fundamental economic interests of the national bourgeoisie
increasingly conflict with the policy of Uc S. monopoly capital. The
aggressive course of the North American militarists also enhances the
anti-imperialist moods of the national bourgeoisie, which does not want
any war."
16 Although the Castroites do not go so far as to deny the
existence of the "national bourgeoisie," or to reject it as an ally0,5
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concerned with the factual existence of the "national bourgeoisie"l
or with its potentialities as an ally than with the mere use of the
term as justification for moderate policies.
Take, for instance, the attitude of the Communists in Guatemala.
In that country, the 13th of November Movement, a small non-Communist
group led by young army officers who had staged an unsuccessful mili-
tary rising in 1960., took to the hills and started a guerrilla cam-
paign in February 1962. In the spring of 1963, the Communists very
rashly allowed themselves to be drawn into a united front, the Frente
Unide de Resistencia, with this group, but the alliance was never a
happy one. It is now breaking up., because the 13th of November
Movement which is doing the actual fighting has adopted a radical
they insist that its cooperation must not be bought by concessions in
matters of basic importance0
17 This was clearly indicated in an article by the Communist
party leader.Hugo Barrios Klee in the March 196 issue of the World
Marxist Review:, "But at present the guerrilla movement does not,) by
itself, determine the political situation in the country0 If the
democratic forces are effectively to shape the course of events it is
necessary, as was said earlier, to form a broad anti-imperialist, anti-
feudal front relying on the actions of the masses o c Neither the
best of programs, no matter how theoretically sound, nor any isolated
actions by a band of courageous men, no matter how courageous they may
be, can take the place of long and painstaking work to organize the
social army of revolution, the struggle of the masses, including the
most diverse social strata, led by the working class 0 , 0 0 2
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program envisaging a socialist revolution in Guatemalao18  The Communists.,
on the other hand, have published a somewhat hysterical document in the
April 1965 number of the World Marist Re-view They say, in part-I
The complexity of the situation is also due
to the fact that conditions vary from area to
area and that resistance to the dictatorship
varies accordingly as to forms and methods 0 . . I
In short, our Party and the other democratic forces
have to act with the greatest flexibility, using
every means at their command to promote the revo-
lutionary struggle-forming legal organizations
wherever possible and organizing a broad movement
of the masses 0 0 0 0
The armed struggle is spreading, even though
its impact on the political development of the
country is not decisive as yet. Its progress
could have been greater had there been no anti-
communist bias against our Party in the discussions
going on within the movement 0 The unfriendly tenor
of the discussions makes a calm dialogue difficult3
183
The political views of the 13th of November Movement are des-
cribed at length in two articles in Huberman and Sweezy' s Monthly Review
May-June 1965. The new program rejects collaboration with the
national bourgeoisie and demands an immediate socialist revolution
It thus goes even farther than the Castroite program as described by
Regis Debray in Les Temps Modernese Consciously or unconsciously,
the 13th of November Movement appears to have adopted Trotskyist
positions.
19
The point at issue is the character of the Guatemalan
revolution and its immediate aims. We Communists
maintain that the present revolutionary struggle
bears a national-democratic character and that all
who aim at freeing the country from the rule of the
semi-feudal oligarchy and the U. S0 imperialists
should join in it. We believe that the national
bourgeoisie, the radical small bourgeoisie, and the
middle classes generally can and should play a pro-
gressive role and contribute to the liberation
struggle of our peoplec Those comrades who think
differently and have evidently fallen for Trotsky-
ist provocation hold that our revolution must be a
socialist revolution, and that the regime to be
established immediately after its victory must be
a workers' and peasants government, that is, one
debarring all other social strata from the revolu-
tionary bloc. In line with this, they call on the
workers everywhere to seize the factories and on
the peasants to take over the landed estates and
set up "organs of state power." Since the politi-
cal struggle in Guatemala has not yet attained a
stage at which these appeals can be carried into
practice, they are utopian and, worse still, objec-
tively provocative0 If those who hold such views
prevailed on the revolutionaries to take this road,
the outcome would be sad, reaction has ample oppor-
tunities for retaliationc These people have also
taken advantage of the polemic in the world Com-
munist movement to aggravate differences in our
country and to attack our Party,,
20
This is clearly the language of people who are afraid and des-
perately anxious to find their wcay out of a dangerous situation,
A regional conference of the 22 Latin American communist parties
which was apparently held in Havana last November does not appear to
have brought about a basic change in the attitude of these parties.
The conference was obviously sponsored by the Russians, and the mere
fact that they got the Cubans down at the table with the pro-Soviet
communist parties, excluding the pro-Chinese splinter groups, was a
diplomatic triumph for them, although strangely enough they have not
taken full advantage of it: neither the name of the place where the
conference took place, nor the list of its participants has been an-
nounced in any official party publication, The communique, published
only in Pravda19 announces "active support for those who are at present
being widely persecuted, as for instance the Venezuelan, Colombian,
Guatemalan, Honduran, Paraguayan and Haitian fighters," but it does
not contain the universal call to arms for which the Castroites are
pressing, and it avoids mention of the central issues now being debated
within the movement in Latin America, such as the peaceful or the
violent road, the national liberation front policy and the role of
the bourgeoisie.
Since the conference, there has been a marked increase in guerrilla
activities in Venezuela and Colombia, and a new guerrilla front has been
opened in Peru. In Venezuela, Italian Communist Party couriers carrying
19 January 19, 1965.
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the sum of $320,000 have been intercepted by the police. Since it is
unlikely that the Italian Communists themselves have put up such a
large sum to support the Venezuelan struggle, one may assume that the
money is of Russian origin. Over the years, the Russians have spent
many millions in economic and military aid to Cuba without being able
to persuade Castro to take their side in the Sino-Soviet conflict.
What he demands is support for his policy of armed revolution in Latin
America. In giving some money to the guerrillas, the Russians may now
at long last have found the only way to appease him and to bribe him
to cover over to their side in the Sino-Soviet conflict. If this were
true, Moscow would, however, still be playing a double game. The
Moscow-controlled World Marxist Review continues to publish statements
by Latin American Communist parties warning their followers against
adventurism and foolhardy romanticism. If anything, these warnings,
which are clearly directed against the Castroites, have become more
frequent and more urgent since the Havana conference, 2 0
20 Such warnings are contained in statements by Latin American
communist spokesmen in the following issues of the World Marxist Review:
February 1965: Brazil, Argentina. March: Panama, Ecuador. April:
Brazil, Guatemala, June: El Salvador. In its February issue, World
Marxist Review also published an article on guerrilla warfare by the
Spanish Republican General Enrique Lister, who clearly polemicized
against the Castroite theory of the "guerrilla nucleus":- "There is
much talk nowadays to the effect that a revolutionary situation can
be developed from a particular center.v In some cases attempts are
22
The situation in the Latin American communist novemient may thus
be characterized as one of confusion and disarray With the Castroites
pressing for action, the Russians adopting an anbiguous attitude, and
a number of Communist Parties confronted by rival, pro-Chinese organi-
zations split off from their own ranks, the entire movement appears to
be in danger of disintegration-I
made to prove this in practice - This claim is. refuted by the Marxist-
Leninist doctrine of this form of struggle., and is disproved by revo-
lutionary experience; A revolutionary situation cannot be created at
will. No 'center' or 'centers can in themselves create a revolution-I
ary situation." Another passage in the same article appears to be
directed against the Venezuelan guerrilLas: "Another lesson we have
learned--and Spain is no exception- is that one must be able to callI
off guerrilla warfare in good time. must 'trim one's sails' and tackt
before it is too late, when it becomes evident that the method chosen
is not the best one and may exhaust the revolutionary vanguard " On
the other hand, the January issue contains an appeal by the Central
Committee of the Paraguayan Communist Party "calling upon the people
to prepare themsel-ves for a general uprising against the Stroessner
dictatorship." A Venezuelan statement in the June issue insists that
"the army is unable to crush the guerrillas) ft A Bolivian statement in
the July issie announces the secession of nine of the 44 members of the
Central Committee to form a rival (pro-Chinese) party and admits that
the secessionists have considerable strength in three departments, and.
have been able to set up parallel organizations in six of the .14 depart-
ments where the Party has regional committees I
